The first objective of the study is to empirically test a number of company size determinants' significance as size proxies in benchmarking CEO remuneration for different sectors of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-listed companies. The second objective is to investigate an issue that has not been examined in previous studies, namely the extent to which companies are able to linearly scale their CEO remuneration and company size without changing the remuneration-to-size ratio. To fulfil the first objective, data extracted from the McGregor BFA database were obtained for 2013, where 244 companies in four sectors, i.e. financial, manufacturing, minerals and services, are analysed using descriptive statistics and simple regression analysis. From the results obtained, to fulfil the second objective, a data envelopment analysis (DEA) model is built to estimate the technical and scale efficiencies of 231 companies. A hypothesis test was helpful to find that the following determinants can be used as proxies for company size: total assets (including intangible assets); market value of assets; total equity; market capitalisation; revenue; and total cost. The confidence level to which the nullhypothesis is rejected leads to the conclusion that those determinants are on their own suitable proxies that make further investigations into joint determinants unnecessary. Furthermore, the study concluded that the majority of companies are not able to linearly scale their CEO remuneration and company size without changing the remuneration-to-size ratio. Therefore, the conceptual theory of scaling is to a great extent rejected, since only nine of 231 companies in the sample investigated could achieve economies of scale. The paper is organised as follows: Section I provides the gap of missing knowledge in the literature as well as the conceptual framework of the study. The data and methodology are described in Section II, after which the results and a discussion thereof are provided in Section III. The study is finally concluded in Section IV.
Introduction
This is an empirical study modelling the relationship between CEO remuneration and company size determinants. The issue of CEO remuneration is part of a company's corporate social responsibility towards investors, employees and other stakeholders (Theunissen, 2012 ; SAPA, 201; Hurtt et al., 2000) . CEO remuneration recently received a great deal of negative media attention in South Africa and companies are accused of the fact that their CEOs are excessively remunerated (Lamprecht, 2014; Finweek, 2012; Joubert, 2011; Ensor, 2010; Financial Mail, 2008; Hindery, 2008) . This media attention led to a number of studies investigating CEO remuneration of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE)-listed companies (Nthoesane and The literature agrees that there are many factors that drive or influence CEO remuneration, for example company size, performance, risk, leverage, ownership, age of CEO, tenure (i.e. number of years served as CEO), labour market influences and board size (Hearn, 2013; Sigler, 2011; Fulmer, 2009; Nwaeze et al., 2006; Gunasekaragea and Wilkenson, 2002) . Some researchers reduced the number of factors to only company size and performance as the two most significant drivers of CEO remuneration (Nulla, 2012; Oberholzer and Theunissen, 2012; Cordeiro et al., 2006; Zhou, 2000) . From all the factors, many authors agree that company size is the single most significant driver and the only factor that has a constant and a positive correlation with CEO remuneration (Dan et al., 2013; Sigler, 2011; Vermeulen, 2008; Devers et al., 2007; Geiger and Cashen, 2007) . Probable reasons for this positive relationship are that larger companies may employ better-qualified managers (Murphy, 1999) , have more operations, subsidiaries and layers of management (Lippert and Moore, 1994) , require a higher level of responsibility from their CEOs who have more complex tasks and therefore place greater value on decision-making (Janssen, 2009 ) and have more requirements by the board (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009) .
The importance of the study is that it attempts to better understand the concept of company size within the context of CEO remuneration and it will assist company board members in setting CEO remuneration. Many previous studies have investigated the relationship between company size determinants and CEO remuneration. Different determinants were used by the researchers to act as a proxy for company size, for example market capitalisation ( Zhou, 2000) , number of employees (Sigler, 2011; Nourayi and Daroca, 2008) , market value of assets (Heaney et al., 2010) and total expenses (Chen et al., 2008) . To emphasise some degree of uncertainty regarding to the appropriate choice for a size proxy, some authors apply multiple determinants of size, for example total assets and sales (Zhou, 2000) , earnings and market capitalisation (Gabaix and Landier, 2008) , total assets and number of employees (Nulla, 2012) , market value of assets and market value of equity (Heany et al., 2010), company value, earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), sales and equity (Gabaix et al., 2013) , as well as total assets, total equity and turnover (Theunissen, 2010) .
Except for number of employees, the abovementioned determinants are in terms of monetary values provided both by companies' statements of comprehensive income and the statements of financial position. All these above-mentioned examples are probably logical choices to define company size. Furthermore, the expectation is also that they are highly correlated with each other. Therefore, the colinearity problem should be taken into account when multiple size determinants are applied in a multiple regression analysis (Wegner, 2007) . Nevertheless, the argument is that these variables are probably not equally effective to define company size within the context of CEO remuneration. The choice of a proxy for size may also differ between the different business sectors (Nourayi and Daroca, 2008) . Therefore, what is needed is a framework that links the size aspect to the responsibility of the CEO. The question is what determinants of company size are most applicable when constructing CEO packages. The first objective of the study is to empirically test the above-mentioned examples' significance as size proxies in benchmarking CEO remuneration for the different sectors. Therefore, the null-hypothesis is that there is no relationship between CEO remuneration and the different company size determinants. The study also argues, according to the idea of Gabaix et al. (2013) , that a combination of size determinants should be considered. That is to consider, for example, defining company size by using certain combinations of the statement of comprehensive income's data in conjunction with the statement of financial position's data.
The second objective of the study is to investigate an issue not examined in previous studies, namely the extent to which companies are able to linearly scale their CEO remuneration and size without changing the remuneration-to-size ratio. In other words, the question is whether the CEO remuneration-to-size ratio stays constant when the CEO's remuneration and/or company size changes. Therefore, the study makes it possible to determine the degree to which companies achieve economies of scale, within the context of CEO remuneration, as the input variable, relative to a certain level of company size, the output variable.
To fulfil the objectives, the epistemology dimension preferred is quantitative research. Secondary data extracted from the McGregor BFA (2014) database were obtained for 2013, where 244 companies in four sectors, i.e. financial, manufacturing, minerals and services, are analysed to reach the first objective, to estimate the relationship between CEO remuneration and different company size determinants, by using descriptive statistics and simple regression analysis. From the results obtained, a data envelopment analysis (DEA) model is built to estimate the efficiencies of 231 companies, where the efficiency estimate is relative to the other companies within the same sector. To reach the second objective, companies in each sector are divided into quadrants analysing the average technical and scale efficiency per sector.
Conceptual scope
The focus of this study is on the dependency of CEO remuneration in relation with different determinants of company size. To put these size variables into proper context, the scaling theory is borrowed to provide a conceptual framework, which includes both constant return to scale (CRS) and variable return to scale (VRS). The CRS implies a proportionate rise in CEO remuneration when company size is increased, or in other words, a company's CEO remuneration-tosize ratio is not influenced by the scale of its operations (Avkiran, 1999) . Using CRS, a company's CEO remuneration-to-size is automatically considered fully scale efficient, implying that the company always achieves economies of scale. This is a significant assumption, since CRS may only be valid over a limited range and its use should be justified (Anderson, 1996) . Alternatively, is the less restricted VRS approach, which implies a disproportionate rise or fall in CEO remuneration when company size is increased; in other words, if a company grows in size, its CEO remuneration-to-size will not remain constant, but it will either rise or fall. Using the VRS approach, the degree of scale efficiency should be estimated; that is where a company is too small in its scale of CEO remuneration-to-size, which falls within the increasing return to scale (IRS) part of the production function, and a company is too large in its scale of CEO remuneration-to-size if it falls within the decreasing return to scale (DRS) part of the production function (Avkiran, 1999; Coelli et al., 2005 ).
Data and methodology

Method
This is an empirical study using existing data from the JSE-listed companies to model correlations between CEO remuneration and some company size determinants. As existing numerical data are used, there exists a medium to high degree of control regarding to the findings of the study (Mouton, 2011) . Validity of the study is ensured by including variables in the descriptive statistics, regression and correlation analysis and the DEA model that can fulfil the two objectives of the study. To ensure reliability, an effort is made to describe the research process in such a way that a repetition thereof will lead to a similar conclusion.
Data
Data were obtained from the McGregor BFA database for 2013. From the database, analysts have a choice between published or standardised data. The former was selected for the study because this is the readily available format provided in companies' annual integrated reports, and this study did not attempt to compare data of different companies, which may require some sort of standardisation.
For this study, companies were grouped into four sectors, namely financial, manufacturing, mineral and service. (In an effort to refine the data, the industrial companies were divided into two groups, i.e. manufacturing and services). The three companies indicated in the oil and gas sector were included in the mineral sector and all the gold companies were excluded since their financial statements' disclosures differ from other companies in this sector. The health sector contains service companies, for example hospitals, which are included in the service sector, and medicine manufacturers, which are included in the manufacturing sector. A total of 304 companies were detected in the database, of which only 245 are operational and/or provided all the required data. After visual inspection of the plotted data, another company was excluded, since it is extremely large with the most extreme CEO remuneration, to avoid a leverage effect in the regression analysis. The remaining 244 companies consist of 68 financial, 78 manufacturing, 45 mineral and 53 service companies. In a few cases, the monetary values are not in terms of rand (ZAR), where the average exchange rate of 2013 was applied to convert the values.
Design
Dependent variable
The dependent variable (y) represents the sum of components of CEO remuneration, which is in accordance with the terms and classification of the McGregor BFA database. The three components included are:
1. Base pay as measured by 'salary' 2. Prerequisites and pension as measured by the total of 'retirement and/or medical' contributions, 'allowances and benefits', 'motor and travel' allowances and 'fee/levy payment' 3. Annual bonus plans as measured by total of 'bonus paid in current year', 'performance bonus', 'other benefits' and "once-off payments'
The database also provides a fourth component, namely long-term incentives as measured by 'gains on shares'. Since these gains are only disclosed in the year that rights are exercised, it is extremely difficult to value them, especially when only one year's data are under consideration. The exclusion of long-term incentives was also practiced in studies such as Scholtz and Smit (2012), Bradley (2011) and Theunissen (2010) .
Independent variables
A literature study was helpful to include independent variables for this study as possible proxies for company size. The variables are classified as data from the statement of financial position (SFP), statement of comprehensive income (SCI) and sundry items. These variables are indicated in parentheses [*] to indicate from which section, and the number in the section, they are extracted from the McGregor BFA database.
Firstly, two statements of financial position's line items were selected as proxies for company size, namely assets and equity, since the CEO is responsible for the investment (acquiring and utilisation assets) and, according to the agent theory, the representative of all shareholders. The total assets (at book value) were used frequently in the past (Nulla, 2012 
Statistical analysis
Firstly, descriptive statistics are used to analyse the independent (x) and the dependent (y) variables. Secondly, to test the null hypothesis, simple linear regression analysis is used where the different determinants of company size are alternately the independent variables (x) and the CEO remuneration the dependent variable (y). Linear regression analysis has frequently been used in the past to analyse and benchmark CEO remuneration (Bradley, Stanwick and Stanwick, 2001) . If a controversial linear relationship between x and y exists, a linear relationship between log x and log y may be considered. Then, the power curve ŷ = ax b is a suitable curve to describe the relationship between x and y. The equation can be written in logarithmic form log ŷ = log a + b log x. If y', a' and x' are indicated by log ŷ, log a, log x, respectively, then this is the equation for linearity, namely y' = a' + bx' with an intercept a' and the slope b (Steyn et al., 1999) .
A hypothesis testing is also performed. The nullhypothesis, H 0 , there is no relationship between CEO remuneration and the company size determinants, is an assertion about the value of the population measure. The value is the current value provisionally accepted as correct until it is proven wrong. The alternative hypothesis, H a , specifies for the population parameter a range of values that are not specified by the null hypothesis (Swanepoel et al., 2010) . A twosided alternative hypothesis claims that the population parameter is not equal to the alleged value under H 0 .
H 0 : regression intercept = 0 H a : regression intercept ≠ 0 H 0 : regression slope = 0 H a : regression slope ≠ 0
DEA as a measure of technical and scale efficiency
A model is needed to reach the second objective, to investigate the extent to which companies can linearly scale their CEO remuneration and size without changing the ratio between them. For this purpose, DEA was selected, which is a non-parametric efficiency measurement technique, using linear programming to estimate a comparative ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs for each company by comparing the efficiency of how the same multiple inputs and the same multiple outputs are converted by a company, relative to other competing companies in the sample (Min et (Avkiran, 1999) . Alternatively, VRS implies a disproportionate rise or fall in outputs when inputs are increased (Avkiran, 1999) . Using CRS, a company is automatically considered fully scale efficient (that is companies are able to linearly scale their inputs and outputs without changing their efficiency), while using the VRS approach, the degree of scale efficiency should be estimated, that is where a scenario is too small in its scale operations, which falls within the increasing return to scale (IRS) part of the production function, and a scenario is too large if it falls within the decreasing return to scale (DRS) part of the production function (Coelli et The above input-orientated formula calculates input minimisation (where θ indicates the efficiency score). Each observation, DMU j (j = 1, ..., n), uses m inputs X ij (i = 1, 2, ...,m) to produce s outputs Y rj (r = 1, 2, ...,s), where DMU o represents one of the n DMUs under evaluation, and X io and Y ro are the ith input and rth output for DMU o , respectively. In order to take any slack into consideration, the inclusion of the nonArchimedean  effectively allows the minimisation over  to pre-empt the optimisation involving the slacks, s i -and s r + (Zhu, 2009 ). Firstly, the technical efficiencies are calculated according to both the CRS and VRS approaches to arrive at a scale efficiency estimate. Technical and scale efficiencies can take on values between zero and one, where zero signals total inefficiency and one total efficiency.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics and linear regression analysis (first objective)
After the data was plotted, the heteroskedasticity of the variances was clear where the spread of the larger values of company size is much larger than those of the smaller company size values, which requires a log transformation to stabilise the data. Power curves seemed to be the best transformation for both heteroskedasticity and the residuals of the fit. An exception was made regarding to the two profit determinants of company size, EBIT and EBITDA, because these data contain some negative values where conventional linear regression analysis was applied. Table 1 exhibits the descriptive statistics of the data. The average values are in all cases much higher than the mean, implying there are a few companies with appreciably higher variable values than the rest of the companies; the frequency distribution is positively skewed. The huge differences between the minimum and maximum values explain the relatively high standard deviation, indicating a wide spread of data. These descriptive statistics, together with the above-mentioned visual inspection of the data, are a clear identification that the effect of non-normality of the dependent variable and the heteroskedasticity of the variances will make a power curve a much more sensible analysis. The coefficients of the intercept (transformed values, except for EBIT and EBITDA) and the xvariables are provided as well as the applicable p values, which indicate with how much confidence H 0 is rejected or not rejected. Regarding Total Assets (1) for financial, manufacturing and service companies, H 0 is not rejected, implying that the indicated intercept is not significant and could be zero. In the rest of the analyses, H 0 will be rejected at a significance level of one per cent, implying the intercepts are significant. In the two cases where a log transformation was not performed, i.e. EBIT and EBITDA, the coefficients of the intercept are for all the company groups higher than the average and the median CEO remuneration, implying that a CEO's fixed remuneration, regardless of the company size, should be higher than the average and/or median remuneration. These high intercept values lead to extremely low x-variable coefficients, implying a very flat regression line. For the financial companies, the x coefficients are even negative, implying a negative slope. H 0 will be rejected at a significance level of one per cent in all of the analyses regarding to the x variable.
According to the findings in this section, it is clear that the following company determinants may be applied as proxies for size, namely statement of financial position-based items, total assets (including intangible assets), market value of assets, total equity and market capitalisation; and statement of comprehensive income-based items, revenue and total cost. The profitability measures, EBIT and EBITDA, and the total assets (excluding intangible assets) are not recommended to use, because their relationship with CEO remuneration is practically not important. Furthermore, staff costs and the number of personnel seem to be excellent proxies for company size, but not all the companies disclose these items.
Technical and scale efficiency (second objective)
To reach the second objective of the study, an inputoutput DEA model is required to calculate the efficiencies, where the input variable is CEO remuneration and the output variables are multiple determinants of company size. From the abovementioned recommended size proxies, it was decided to apply two items each from the statement of financial position and statement of comprehensive income. To ensure a variety in the data market values of assets and total equity, the largest and the smallest components in the statement of financial position, respectively, were selected. The two recommended size proxies from the statement of comprehensive income, revenue and total costs, are also included. To summarise, in the DEA model, the input and output variables are: Input:
x 1 = CEO remuneration Output: y 1 = Market value of assets y 2 = Total equity y 3 = Revenue y 4 = Total cost For a company to be technically efficient, it should use as little as possible input (CEO remuneration) relative to as high as possible multiple outputs (company size). Normally, an item such as total costs will not be selected for an output variable, since companies aim to lower costs, but within this context, total costs (and the other three output variables) represent the company size, with the assumption that companies are aiming to expand their size. After the data were cleaned up by eliminating outliers, especially from the financial sector, descriptive statistics were calculated to present the following summary of the data per sector (Table 3) . Table 4 exhibits a summary of the three efficiency estimates. For a more detailed analysis, each sector has been broken up into quadrants according to the ranking of CEO remuneration. To explain, the average TE VRS of 0.261, 0.516, 0.236 and 0.443 for financial, manufacturing, mineral and service companies, respectively, implies that the input, CEO remuneration, should on average decrease by 73.9, 48.4, 76.4 and 55.7% for this group of companies, respectively, to operate on the less restricted VRS efficiency frontier. Table 4 provides clear evidence that companies with lower levels of CEO remuneration tend to have higher TE VRS values, implying that they will find it easier than larger companies to move to the VRS frontier.
The average TE CRS of 0.175, 0.190, 0.102, and 0.246 for financial, manufacturing, mineral and service companies, respectively, indicates the overall possible improvement, implying that, on average, companies in those groups should reduce CEO remuneration by 82.5, 81.0, 89.8 and 75.4%, respectively, to operate on the CRS frontier. In other words, from an input-oriented approach, CEO remuneration should on average be reduced by these latter percentages to enable the companies to linearly scale their CEO remuneration and size without changing the remuneration-to-size ratio. Manufacturing companies, and to a lesser extent service companies, show a trend suggesting that it is easier for larger companies to operate on the CRS frontier than it is for smaller companies.
The average scale efficiency of 0.574, 0.353, 0.371 and 0.524 for financial, manufacturing, mineral and service companies, respectively, indicates that those groups of companies should reduce CEO remuneration by another 42.6, 64.7, 62.9 and 47.6% to move from the VRS frontier to the CRS frontier to achieve economies of scale. The results regarding scale efficiency of all four sectors are similar, namely the scale efficiencies are the highest in quadrant 1, second highest in quadrant 2, followed by quadrants 3 and 4. Table 4 also exhibits that only two, three, two and two companies in the financial, manufacturing, mineral and service sectors, respectively, achieved CRS, implying that only those nine companies are fully scale efficient. Although the CRS approach is based on the assumption that companies are able to linearly scale their inputs and outputs without changing their efficiency, its value is that it has helped to arrive at the conclusion that 54, 75, 42 and 51 companies in the financial, manufacturing, minerals and service sector, respectively, did not achieve economies of scale. A few of these companies fall in the DRS part of the operation function, implying that they are too large in their scale of operations. The majority of the companies fall in the IRS part of operation, implying that they are too small in their scale of operations. 
Conclusion
The first objective of the study was to empirically test a number of company size determinants' significance as size proxies in benchmarking CEO remuneration for the different sectors. The hypothesis test was helpful to find that the following determinants can be used as proxies for company size, namely from the statement of financial position, total assets (including intangible assets), market value of assets, total equity and market capitalisation; and determinants from the statement of comprehensive income, revenue and total cost. The high determination coefficients (R 2 > 0.25) and the confidence level of rejecting the nullhypothesis (p < 0.01) regarding to all these determinants in all sectors, led to the conclusion that they are on their own suitable proxies for company size and no further combinations, for example joint determinants from the statement of financial position and statement of comprehensive income, are necessary.
What makes this study unique is that it also investigated the extent to which companies are able to linearly scale their CEO remuneration and size without changing the remuneration-to-size ratio. An analysis of technical efficiencies according to the CRS and VRS approaches and scale efficiency has been done. The low average TE VRS efficiency estimates of 0.261, 0.516, 0.236 and 0.443 for financial, manufacturing, mineral and service companies, respectively, led to the conclusion that most companies are not able to operate on the VRS frontier. The even lower average TE CRS efficiency estimates of 0.175, 0.190, 0.102, and 0.246 for financial, manufacturing, mineral and service companies, respectively, led to the conclusion that all the companies in the sample, except the nine that achieved economies of scale (SE = 100%), are not able to keep the remuneration-to-size ratio constant when changing the CEO remuneration and/or the company size. Only nine companies are operating on the CRS frontier, implying that they achieved economies of scale. The majority of the companies fall in the increasing return to scale part and few in the decreasing return to scale part of the production function. To explain, say, for example, that the CEO remuneration is dependent on the company size as measured by total assets and the company can achieve economies of scale by paying its CEO 100 monetary units within a specific period; if it is operating on an increasing return to scale, it may, for example, require 50 per cent of the total assets to pay ten per cent of CEO pay, namely ten monetary units. On the opposite side, if it is producing on a decreasing return to scale, it may require, for example, three times as many total assets only to double the CEO pay. The value of this study is that it contributes to the literature because it indicates suitable proxies for company size when benchmarking CEO remuneration. Furthermore, the study concluded that the majority of companies are not able to linearly scale their CEO remuneration and company size without changing the remuneration-tosize ratio. The value of the study lies in the practical implication that many company size determinants are identified that can be used by board members to benchmark their CEO's package. Furthermore, the conceptual theory of scaling is to a great extent rejected, since only nine of 231 companies in the sample investigated could achieve economies of scale. Since most of the companies operate on the increasing return to scale part of the production function, analysts investigating CEO remuneration must keep this phenomenon in mind, i.e. that the remunerationto-size ratio mostly favours CEOs. Further research that is recommended is to also investigate the scaling issue when other determinants of CEO remuneration, especially company performance, are included.
